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Abstract
I study how rules of origin in potential export destinations influence firm- and
industry-level export behavior in least-developed countries (LDCs). Rules of origin
restrict LDCs from taking advantage of preferential tariff rates in export markets,
and this undermines market access for LDCs and reduces the efficacy of export-
oriented industrialization. I develop a model of multi-product firms in which rules
of origin influence the product scope and export revenue of final goods producers
through their effect on input sourcing decisions. I test the model’s predictions using
the 2011 revisions to the EU’s rules of origin for apparel products from LDCs. To
control for the potential endogeneity of the policy change I use a triple-difference
approach, exploiting variation in the input-cost differentials across apparel products
and export destination, before and after the EU policy change. Liberalizing rules of
origin results in revenue gains, expansion of product scope, and firm entry into the
export market. Within firms, incumbents upgrade product quality. Across firms,
market share is reallocated toward more productive incumbents.
Keywords: Rules of origin, Non-tariff barriers, Economic development, Exports-oriented
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1 Introduction
In an effort to integrate least-developed countries (LDCs) into the global economy, in-
dustrialized countries have been offering preferential treatment to imports from LDCs
for several decades. For example, the EU offers reduced tariff rates on the majority
of imported goods from LDCs. The United States, Canada, and other industrialized
countries offer similar programs to LDCs. However, existing research indicates that
only a fraction of imports from LDCs actually receive the preferential treatment they
are offered by these programs (Hakobyan, 2015; Carrere and de Melo, 2004; Wijayasiri,
2007; Brenton, 2006). This has led the World Trade Organization (WTO) to focus on
non-tariff barriers faced by LDCs during the Doha Round of global trade negotiations.1
Chief among the concerns raised by LDCs in the Doha Round were the restrictive nature
of rules of origin in potential export markets (Barber, 2004).
Rules of origin are the criteria used to establish the nationality of a final good,
and used to determine whether or not an imported product qualifies for preferential
treatment. Typically, rules of origin require a “sufficient transformation” of imported
intermediate inputs or a specific amount of local content in imported products. Satis-
fying rules of origin that require a large fraction of local content, or a capital-intensive
transformation of inputs is difficult for exporters in LDCs, where value added to final
goods typically only comes from labor. This keeps LDCs from taking advantage of prefer-
ential trade agreements. As result, tariffs applied in industrialized countries to imported
goods from LDCs tend to be higher than the preferential rates that are offered. In this
sense, rules of origin can undermine market access for LDCs and reduce the efficacy of
export-oriented industrialization.
In this paper, I study how rules of origin in potential export destinations influence
firm- and industry-level export behavior in LDCs. There is a growing literature on trade
responses to rules of origin. The existing literature provides evidence that country-
1https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/devel e/dev special differential provisions e.htm
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level trade flows respond to changes in rules of origin policies (Curran and Nadvi, 2014;
Bombarda and Gamberoni, 2009; Conconi et al, 2018) and provides evidence on how
firms endogenously sort across export markets based on differences in rules of origin in
the cross-section (Demidova et al, 2012; Cherkashin et al, 2015; Kee and Krishna, 2008).
However, the response of firms to liberalization of rules of origin associated with existing
preferential trade agreements is scarce.2 The recent attention to rules of origin revisions
under NAFTA highlights the need for an analysis of how rules of origin influence firm-
level export performance.3 Furthermore, understanding the firm-level responses to rules
of origin revisions is necessary for developing effective trade policy, especially in LDCs
where export-industries are important drivers of economic development.
I develop a model of multi-product firms in which rules of origin in potential export
destinations influence the product scope and export revenue of final goods exporters
through their effect on input sourcing decisions. While Demidova et al. (2012) and
Bombarda and Gamberni (2009) show how rules of origin can be incorporated into het-
erogeneous firm models, I show how incorporating multi-product firms produces new
margins over which exporters respond to rules of origin. Specifically, I show that lib-
eralizing rules of origin in a multi-product firm setting not only affects input sourcing
decisions and trade preference utilization rates, but also product output mix.
I test the model’s predictions using the 2011 revisions to the EU’s rules of origin
for apparel products from LDCs. The revision allowed apparel producers in LDCs to
use more imported content in their exported products, which alleviated the capacity
constraints in the production of textiles in LDCs. To control for the potential endogeneity
of the policy change, I use a triple-difference approach, exploiting variation in the input-
cost differentials across apparel products and export destinations, before and after the
EU policy change.
2One exception to this is Cadot et al (2014), who analyze how firm-level export revenue responds to
rules of origin changes in Colombia. However, the authors note they are unable to disentangle the effects
of the rules of origin liberalization from tariff rate changes that occurred at the same time.
3See: https://piie.com/newsroom/short-videos/toughening-naftas-rules-origin-could-backfire
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Using firm-level transaction data for Bangladeshi apparel exporters I find evidence
that the revision of the rules of origin resulted in export revenue gains, expansion of
exported product scope, and entry into the export market. Additionally, I find evidence
that incumbent firms upgraded product quality and reduced quality-adjusted prices. To
my knowledge, this is the first study to link rules of origin with exported product qual-
ity. The existing literature has focused almost exclusively on product quality responses
to liberalization of input and output tariffs (Bas and Strass-Khan, 2014; Amiti and
Khandelwal, 2013; Fan et al., 2105; Bas, 2012).4 The expansion of product-scope and
upgrading the quality of exiting product lines are important facets of export-oriented
growth policies, thus the results in this paper underscore the policy concerns of LDCs
regarding restrictive rules of origin. Finally, I find that within the apparel export indus-
try market share was reallocated toward more productive incumbents after the policy
change.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the con-
text in which this study takes place. In Section 3, I present the theoretical model and
discuss the models predictions. In Sections 4 and 5, I discuss the empirical framework
and present the empirical results. In Section 6, I analyze the robustness of the main re-
sults. In Sections 7 and 8 I examine additional within-firm and industry-level responses,
respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Context
This section provides a brief overview of the institutional context of the apparel industry
in Bangladesh, and market access to EU countries for Bangladeshi apparel exporters.
4One exception is Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013), who study the effects of the removal of export
quotas on Chinese apparel firms.
3
2.1 The EU’s Everything But Arms Agreement
The EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a unilateral agreement that
grants preferential tariff treatment for imports of goods from many developing coun-
tries. Within the GSP, the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) arrangement allows for
duty-free and quota-free trade in all goods, except arms and ammunition, between EU
countries and 48 LDCs.5 The EBA went into effect in 2001, with the stated goal of
helping LDCs integrate further into the global economy. Under the EBA, apparel and
clothing imports into the EU would be granted preferential treatment if they were made
under a “double-transformation” process. Double-transformation refers to a production
process where imported inputs are transformed at least two times before being exported
as final goods. For example, in order to export a t-shirt to the EU and qualify for the
preferential treatment under the EBA, the t-shirt must be made from fabric that was
also produced within the exporting country.
While the rule was designed to encourage backward-linkages in developing economies,
it was criticized for being too difficult for many producers to satisfy (Barber et al.,
2004). Small concessions were made in the EBA at the time it was ratified; for example,
allowing garments made from textiles imported from other LDCs to qualify for the EBA
arrangement (Sekkel, 2009). However, even with these concessions it remained difficult
for apparel producers to satisfy the rules of origin. Apparel products made from textiles
imported from major textiles producers like China, Hong Kong, India, and Pakistan
would not qualify for the EBA, as these countries were not LDCs as determined by the
United Nations. According to COMTRADE data, only 1% of woven textile imports into
Bangladesh came from other LDCs, and the vast majority (roughly 70%) of imports
came from China and Hong Kong. Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs of between
12% and 15% tariff was applied to apparel goods that were not able to satisfy these
5The least developed country label is given to developing countries by the United Nations. It is based
on levels of poverty, resource weakness, and economic instability. The number of LDCs have change over
time, but at the time of the EBA revision there were 48 LCDs. Currently, in 2018, there are 47.
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rules of origin. Recognizing the reliance of the ready-made-garment sector on imported
intermediate inputs, Bangladesh has a duty-free policy of their own for imports of textiles
used in exported apparel products (Kabir et al., 2019). Thus, for export-oriented firms,
a major cost associated with imported textiles came from the inability of exporters to
utilize preferential trade agreements like the EBA.
On November 18th, 2010, the EU announced there would be a revision of the rules
of origin associated with the EBA for a number of goods. Then, on January 1st, 2011,
the new rules of origin were put into effect. While discussions of a revision to the
rules of origin had been on-going for several years, the first announcement of the rule
changes came in November of 2010. One of the largest changes came in the form of
a relaxation of the double-transformation policy for apparel, which was changed to a
single-transformation policy. The single-transformation policy allows for apparel made
from imported textiles to qualify for the preferential treatment under the EBA regardless
of the source.
The garment industry accounts for over three quarters of Bangladeshi export value
(Ahsan and Iqbal, 2017), and roughly 13 percent of GDP (Heath, 2018). Roughly 80
percent of exports from Bangladesh are apparel (HS codes 61 and 62), approximately 51
percent of which goes to EU countries. Naturally, the change to a single-transformation
policy had the potential to greatly influence Bangladeshi exports, and the economy
as a whole, as the apparel manufacturing industry employs roughly 40 percent of the
country’s labor force (Curran and Nadvi, 2014). Anecdotal evidence of the influence of
the policy change can be seen in Figure 1. Using data from the World Bank Enterprise
Survey, the figure shows survey responses of Bangladeshi apparel firms to a question of
“To what degree is customs and trade regulation an obstacle to the current operations
of this establishment?” when asked in 2011 and 2013. Figure 1 suggests that apparel
exporters found customs and trade regulations less burdensome after the rules of origin
associated with exports to a major trade partner (the EU) were relaxed.
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Importance of Customs and Trade Regulations as Trade Obstacle for Apparel
Exporters
Figure 1: This figure displays the responses from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for
Bangladeshi apparel firms. Data for this figure was collected from the 2011 and 2013
round of the survey. The responses are for exporting apparel firms only. Respondents
were asked how much an obstacle customs and trade regulations were. No data for
apparel firms was available before 2011. The survey responses were collected between
May and June 2011, roughly six months after the policy change went into affect.
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More direct evidence of the effect of the revision to the double-transformation pol-
icy can be seen in Figure 2. This figure displays the utilization rate of the EBA by
Bangladeshi apparel exporters. The utilization rate is calculated as the fraction of EU
apparel imports from Bangladesh processed under the EBA, relative to the total EU
apparel imports from Bangladesh. The data from the figure comes from EuroStat’s Im-
ports by Tariff Regime database. The top panel of the figure displays the total change
in utilization rates. In 2011, the rate increases roughly 15 percentage points. The bot-
tom panel of the figure breaks down the utilization rates by product type. As is evident,
woven apparel products responded dramatically to the policy change, while knitted prod-
ucts did not respond. Relative to the change in the utilization rate for knitted products,
the utilization rate for woven products increased by roughly 50 percentage points. The
restrictive nature of the double-transformation policy for woven products is discussed
further in the next section.
2.2 The Apparel Export Industry in Bangladesh
Due to its large labor force, Bangladesh has had a comparative advantage in apparel
assembly (a labor-intensive process) for several decades. Unlike other major garment
producing countries, apparel production is mainly locally financed. In 2005, roughly 97%
of apparel firms only sourced capital locally (Bakht et al, 2006). By 2016, this number
had only fallen to 91% (Lopez-Acevedo and Robertson, 2016). While assembling apparel
is a labor-intensive process, the full production process involves several capital-intensive
stages. As discussed in Curran and Nadvi (2014), apparel manufacturing takes place
in three broad stages: (1) spinning of yarn from natural or man-made fibers, (2) the
production of fabric or textiles, and (3) the production of a final apparel good. In
the case of Bangladesh (and many other LDCs), much of this final apparel product
is exported. While the third stage is a labor-intensive process, the first two are more
capital-intensive.
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Change in EBA utilization rate for apparel products
Figure 2: This figure displays utilization rate of the EBA for Bangladeshi apparel prod-
ucts. The data comes from EuroStat. The utilization rate is calculated as the value of
imports into the EU that were processed under the EBA, relative to the total value of
imports into the EU regardless of how the imports were processed.
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Table 1: Textile Sourcing in Bangladesh
Study % Knit Textiles Locally Sourced % Woven Textiles Locally Sourced
Fredric and Staritz (2012) 60-70% 12-15%
Masum (2016) 90% 40%
Hayashi (2007) 80% <30%
The general process outlined above is similar for all apparel, however there is hetero-
geneity in the amount of capital needed to produce different fabrics. Broadly speaking,
this difference can be seen in the production of woven versus knitted fabric. Produc-
tion of woven fabric requires weaving multiple threads over and under each other in
a criss-cross pattern, and is done in large plants. As noted in Frederic and Staritz’s
(2012) study of the Bangladeshi textile and apparel industry, producing woven fabrics
is an energy-intensive process, and while labor-intensive hand-looms can produce woven
fabric they are typically too inefficient to use at a large scale. Other stages of woven
textile production, like dying, are also capital-intensive. Knitted fabric, on the other
hand, is much less capital-intensive to produce. In fact, many knitted apparel products
can be directly made from yarn, “bypassing” the second stage of production outlined
above.6 As a result, Bangladeshi knitted garments are much less reliant on imported
intermediate inputs than woven garments.
Several studies provide estimates of the ability of Bangladesh’s textile industry to
supply the apparel industry. Table 1 displays estimates from three studies on the percent
of textiles sourced locally in Bangladesh for woven and knitted apparel products. In
all cases, the percent of locally sourced textiles used in woven apparel production is
substantially lower than locally sourced knitted textiles.
Given these differences in the production process of woven versus knitted apparel,
the change in the rules of origin from a double-transformation to single-transformation
was likely to affect woven apparel exports more than knitted apparel exports. Evidence
of this discrepancy can be seen in the change in EBA utilization rates in the bottom
6Producing knitted garments in this way would still qualify as a double-transformation, because the
garment would be entirely composed of textiles made within Bangladesh.
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panel of Figure 2. For exporters of woven apparel, the new rules grant woven clothing
preferential treatment even if made completely from imported fabric. This difference
helps inform the empirical framework used in this paper.
3 A model with heterogeneous multi-product firms and rules of origin
In this section I outline a model of trade that extends the multi-product firm model in
Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011) (BRS hereafter), and the demand-shock model in
Demidova et al (2012). The multi-product firm framework is appropriate in this situation
as Bangladeshi apparel firms export an average of five products per destination (as shown
in Table 4). The focus of the model is on final good producers, and abstracts away from
the intermediate good sector. This is done due to data limitations (I do not have data
that would allow me to analyze the intermediate sector), and due to the relative size of
the final goods apparel sector compared to the textile sectors in LDCs.
In the model, firms decide whether to enter an export market, which products to
supply, and whether to export while invoking the rules of origin or export without
invoking the rules of origin. Invoking the rules of origin is costly, but doing so grants a
firm access to preferential tariff rates under a preferential trade agreement. Products are
imperfect substitutes, and each firm can produce a differentiated variety of each product.
Production requires labor and an intermediate input, and competition is monopolistically
competitive.
3.1 Modeling decisions
As discussed in other studies of the Bangladeshi apparel export sector, there is a consider-
able amount of idiosyncratic variation in exports across destinations. For example, using
data from 2004, Demidova et al (2012) note the lack of apparent market “hiearchary”.
They show that Bangladeshi apparel firms appear to export products to highly compet-
10
Fixed Effects R2
Dest-HS8 .106
Dest-HS8+Firm .298
Dest-HS8 + Firm-HS8 .611
Table 2: R2 from regressions of log firm sales on different sets of fixed effects.
itive markets without exporting the same products to less competitive ones.
The lack of market hierarchy is apparent in Bangladeshi apparel firm export decisions
is explained by idiosyncratic product demand shocks across import markets. I document
this using an analysis of explained variation in the sales of exported apparel products
in 2010, the year prior to the rules of origin revision in the EU. Table 2 displays the R2
statistic when regressing the log of export revenue–measured at the firm, destination,
and HS8 product level–on a variety of fixed effects.
The Destination-product fixed effects, which control for any common trade barriers
across firms in Bangladesh exporting a given product, explain roughly 11 percent of the
variation in log export sales. The addition of firm fixed effects, which control for firm
ability, explain roughly 33% of the remaining 89.4% of the variation in log export sales
after the inclusion of destination-product fixed effects. Firm-product fixed effects, which
control for firm ability, and the average product attributes across the range of products a
firm sells, account for roughly 44% of the remaining variation. This leaves roughly 20%
of the variation unexplained. I introduce destination-product specific demand shocks,
which allows me to incorporate this variation into the model.
3.2 Demand
Following BRS, there is a representative consumer in each country j ∈ J who has CES
utility over a continuum of products. The continuum of products is normalized to the
interval [0,1].
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Uj = [
∫ 1
0
Cηjkdk]
1/η (1)
Here, k indexes products, and η is the elasticity of substitution across products. Cjk
is a consumption index. The consumption index also takes the CES form, and depends
on the varieties consumed:
Cjk = [
J∑
i=1
∫
ω∈Ωijk
(λijk(ω)cijk(ω))
ρdω]
1
ρ (2)
where ω indexes varieties of product k, Ωijk is the set of all products available in
country j from country i, and λijk(ω) represents a “product attribute”, as in BRS.
The product attribute term encompasses product quality (which may be the same in
all j), as well as idiosyncratic taste variation that differs across j’s. The fact that the
product attribute term is country specific means that product attributes enter the utility
of consumers in different countries differently. In this sense, the λijk(ω) term is similar
to the demand-shock term in Demidova et al (2012), but allows for variation across
products as well.
Defining σ ≡ 11−ρ > 1 as the elasticity of substitution across varieties within products,
the corresponding price index is:
Pjk = [
∑
i
∫
ω∈Ωijk
(
pijk(ω)
λijk(ω)
)1−σdω]1/(1−σ) (3)
3.3 Firms
There is an unbounded measure of potential firms, each of which can supply a horizon-
tally differentiated variety of each of the continuum of products. Firms are differentiated
by their ability, φ. To enter the domestic market, firms must pay a fixed entry cost, fe.
After paying the fixed entry cost firms observe their ability, which is drawn from a
continuous distribution g(φ), with CDF G(φ). Because I work with data containing in-
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formation only on exports, I assume that all firms who export have already paid the fixed
entry cost and observed their productivity. Ultimately, this assumption does not affect
the model going forward, however, it abstracts away entry into the domestic market.7
Firms are also differentiated by their product attributes, λjk. Product attributes,
which are drawn from a known distribution z(λ) and are independently and identically
distributed across the continuum of products.8 Product attributes are drawn sepa-
rately for each destination and product pair. This captures the idiosyncrasies in apparel
product demand documented in Demidova et al (2012), Kee and Krishan (2008), and
documented in section 3.1.
3.4 Production
To see how restrictive rules of origin influence the production of final goods, consider
the simple production function for a firm with productivity φ:
qk = f(φ, L,Xk) (4)
Here, production of product k requires only labor (L) and a single intermediate good
(Xk). This single intermediate good is produced in a perfectly competitive global mar-
ket, where producers of the intermediate good may also differ in terms of productivity.
Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), producers of the final good search for the lowest
price of this intermediate good, paying px,k = minm∈J(p
m
x,k), where m denotes global
producers of the intermediate good, with potentially m = i. In this sense, px,k can be
thought of as the lowest global price for input X inclusive of any potential trade costs
associated with importing the good from other countries. Rules of origin that place
7It should be noted that the “domestic market” in the case of the Bangladeshi apparel industry mainly
consists of factory seconds. Given that the vast majority of apparel produced by Bangladeshi apparel
firms is exported and the lack of domestic retail stores there are few firms that produce exclusively for
the domestic market (Lopez-Acevedo and Robertson, 2016).
8These assumptions simplify the calculations going forward by letting firms profit-maximize over each
product separately. Ultimately, they do not change the models predictions on how firms respond to rules
of origin liberalization.
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limits on where inputs can be sourced will restrict the set of potential prices over which
firms can search for a minimum. The restriction on the set of prices over which firms can
search will result in the lowest input price being greater than or equal to the unrestricted
price.
To further solidify this concept, I assume f(φ, L,Xk) is Cobb-Douglas. This results
in a marginal cost for a firm with productivity φ producing good k of:
ck(φ,w, Px,k) =
Γwαpβx,k
φ
(5)
where w is the wage, and Γ is a constant9, and α and β are output elasticities. Wages
are assumed to be constant across products, and are normalized to one going forward.
Exporting to country j involves paying iceberg trade costs, τj > 1. Trade costs
include transport costs, tariffs, and other trade barriers which vary by country. If a
firm invokes the rules of origin for country j, its products are exposed to lower tariff
rates. I define τPTAj and τ
MFN
j as the trade costs associated with the preferential trade
agreement (PTA) associated with invoking the rules of origin, and the non-rules of origin
trade costs (MFN) associated with exports that do not meet the rules of origin standards
and to which MFN tariffs are applied. Because firms invoking the rules of origin face
lower tariffs, τPTAj < τ
MFN
j . To invoke the rules of origin, firms can only source the
intermediate input from specific countries. This restricts the set of global prices over
which firms can search for the lowest px,k, resulting in firms paying p¯x,k ≥ px,k for the
input.10 Normalizing wages to one, the total cost functions for firms that invoke rules
of origin (PTA), and those that do not (MFN) are shown below:
TCPTAjk (φ, λ) = (Fj + fjk + dj +
τPTAj Γqjk(φ, λ)p¯
β
x,k
φλjk
) (6)
9Γ = (α
β
)β + (α
β
)−α
10Demidova et al (2012) estimate that the cost of using woven textiles made in Bangladesh for the
production of apparel is roughly 15% higher than importing it from other countries.
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TCMFNjk (φ, λ) = (Fj + fjk +
τMFNj Γqjk(φ, λ)p
β
x,k
φλjk
) (7)
Along with the marginal costs of producing and exporting discussed above the total
cost of exporting a product to country j also depends on several fixed costs. First,
regardless of how a firm decides to export its product it must pay a market-entry fixed
cost Fj . This accounts for factors like market research, or any cost associated with
learning about destination market j. For any product the firm decides to export, there
are additional fixed costs associated with advertising, setting up distributors for the
product, and so on. These fixed costs are captured by the fjk term. This term is
product specific because some products may require different types of advertising, or
have different general product standards required in country j. Finally, if a firm decides
to export the product while invoking the rules of origin, it must document that the rules
of origin were satisfied. Previous research has shown that this documentation cost is
high for many firms in LDCs (Brenton, 2003). The term dj captures this fixed cost.
11
The firm’s profit maximization problem results in choosing a price for each product
separately, and under monopolistic competition this results in a price that is a constant
mark-up over the marginal cost. The price set for product k, with attributes λjk, by a
firm with productivity φ choosing to either meet, not meet, the rules of origin are given
by:
pPTAjk (φ, λ) =
τPTAj p¯
β
x,k
χφλjk
pMFNjk (φ, λ) =
τMFNj p
β
x,k
χφλjk
11This fixed cost can be thought of as gaining legal insight into documenting the rules of origin for
country j. It is not product specific, however, allowing it to vary by product would not change the
predictions of the model.
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where χ = ρΓ and is a constant. As can be seen in the pricing rules above, the higher a
firms productivity (φ) the lower the price it will charge for good k. Similarly, the more
attractive a firms variety of product k is in country j (λjk) the lower the optimal price.
Given these pricing rules, export revenue and profits for firms invoking the rules of origin
(PTA) and those not meeting the rules of origin (MFN) are as follows:
rPTAjk (φ, λ) = (τ
PTA
j p¯
β
x,k)
(1−σ) 1
σ
Ejk(Pjkχ)
σ−1φσ−1λσ−1jk (8)
πPTAjk (φ, λ) = r
PTA
jk (φ, λ)− fjk − dj (9)
rMFNjk (φ, λ) = (τ
MFN
j p
β
x,k)
(1−σ) 1
σ
Ejk(Pjkχ)
σ−1φσ−1λσ−1jk (10)
πMFNjk (φ, λ) = r
MFN
jk (φ, λ)− fjk (11)
where, Ejk is the total expenditure in country j on product k. Given the competitive
nature of the global apparel industry, I assume a firm is unable to influence the price
index for any product.12 In order for any firm to find it profitable to invoke the rules of
origin the condition
τMFNj
τPTAj
> (
p¯x,k
px,k
)β must hold. Otherwise, rPTAjk < r
MFN
jk for any level
of firm ability.13 The ratio between the price firms pay for the intermediate input when
invoking the rules of origin relative the global minimum price captures the restrictive
nature of rules of origin on firm’s sourcing decisions.
3.5 Product-level profitability
Given this set up, only products with desirable enough attributes will allow a firm of
ability φ to generate enough revenue to cover the product fixed cost of exporting to
12Although the price index is treated as exogenous in this paper, the price index can be endogenenized.
Essentially, the endogeneity of the price index results in predictions similar to those found in Bombarda
and Gamberni (2009). When the rules of origin are liberalized, high productivity incumbents lower their
prices and the overall price index in j falls. This reduces the profitability of low productivity incumbents
and forces them out of the market. Empirically, I do not find support for this prediction in the data.
13Note that this condition is consistent with the empirical work in Demidova et al. (2012), where it is
estimated that sourcing woven textiles locally costs 15% more than importing them.
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country j. Furthermore, only products with the most desirable attributes will allow
firms to invoke the rules of origin because the fixed costs and marginal costs are higher.
Therefore, within a firm, there is endogenous sorting of exported products between those
exported using the rules of origin and those that are not. I define two zero-profit product
attribute cutoffs, λMFNjk (φ) and λ
PTA
jk (φ) to capture the endogenous thresholds above
which a product will be exported without using the rules of origin, and when they will
be exported using the rules of origin, respectively.
The zero-profit product attribute cutoff λMFNjk (φ) is the lowest level of product at-
tributes that are sufficient to generate enough profits to export a product without in-
voking the rules of origin. That is, it is the minimum level of product attributes for a
firm with ability φ that allow the firm to export the product profitably to country j.
The second zero-profit product attribute cutoff λPTAjk (φ) is the lowest level of product
attributes for a firm with productivity φ that allows the firm to profitably export the
product to country j while invoking the rules of origin. The zero-profit product attribute
cutoffs are defined as:
rMFNjk (φ, λ
MFN
jk (φ)) = σfjk (12)
rPTAjk (φ, λ
PTA
jk (φ)) = σ(fjk + dj) (13)
Equations (12) and (13) highlight how the fixed costs of invoking the rules of origin
affect the range of products a firm of ability φ is able to export to country j. The
higher the documentation costs, the higher the zero-profit cutoff for product attributes
necessary for exporting under the preferential trade agreement. The equations also
show how both zero-profit cutoffs for product attributes increase as the elasticity of
substitution increases. That is, as the varieties of product k become more substitutable
competition increases and firms must export products with better attributes in order to
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cover the fixed exporting costs.
Products with λjk < λ
MFN
jk (φ) will not be able to generate enough revenue to cover
the fixed cost of exporting a product to country j, even without invoking the rules of
origin. Products with attributes λjk ∈ [λ
MFN
jk (φ), λ
PTA
jk (φ)) will be profitable to export
to country j without invoking rules of origin, but not profitable enough to export to j
under the preferential trade agreement. Finally, products with λjk > λ
PTA
jk (φ) will be
profitable to export to country j while invoking the rules of origin. Thus, within a firm,
there is sorting across products based on how attractive the product is in country j.
This is shown graphically in Figure 3.
Using the zero-profit cutoffs above, the relative revenue for a firm of ability φ, between
using the rules of origin and not using the rules of origin can be expressed as:
λPTA(φ) = λMFN (φ)(
fjk + dj
fjk
)
1
σ−1 (
τPTAj p¯
β
x,k
τMFNj p
β
x,k
) (14)
From equation (14), the more restrictive the rules of origin are for intermediate input
sourcing the higher the zero-profit cutoff for exporting under the PTA. It can also be
seen in equation (14) that the higher the unrestricted minimum price of the intermediate
input (px,k), the lower the zero profit cutoff for using the PTA. The intuition here is that
if the price of the intermediate input is high the export market will be less competitive
in general. Lower competition in the export market will allow firms to export products
with worse attributes while using the PTA.
3.6 Firm-level profitability
A firm’s profitability in market j is determined by the revenue across all of the products
it sells in the market. In order to enter market j, firms must pay a fixed cost Fj . Only
after paying Fj do firms observe their product attributes for the market, λjk. Because
product attributes are distributed independently across the continuum of products, the
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Zero-Profit Cutoff for Product Attributes
λjk(φ)
πjk(φ, λjk)
0
−fjk
πMFNjk (φ, λjk)
λMFNjk (φ)
−(fjk + dj)
πPTAjk (φ, λjk)
λPTAjk (φ)
Figure 3: This figure displays the zero-profit cutoffs for product attributes, described by
equations (12) and (13).
19
law of large numbers implies that the expected revenue across the continuum of products
is equal to the expected revenue for each product. The expected profit for each product k
exported to country j is equal to the probability of drawing a value of product attributes
above either λMFNj (φ) or above λ
PTA
j (φ), multiplied by the expected profit (π
MFN
j , or
πPTAj ), conditional on supplying the product. A firm’s expected profit in each market j
is given by:
Πj(φ) =
∫ λPTAjk (φ)
λMFN
jk
(φ)
[rMFNjk (φ, λjk(φ))− σfjk]z(λ)dλ+
∫
∞
λPTA
jk
(φ)
[rPTAjk (φ, λjk(φ))− σ(fjk + dj)]z(λ)dλ− Fj
(15)
The higher a firm’s ability, the higher the probability of drawing a value of product
attributes that is attractive enough to supply the product to country j while invoking
origin [1−Z(λPTAjk (φ))]. This is because high overall ability can make up for low product
attributes in the product-level profit equations. The probability that a firm with ability
φ will be able to profitably supply a product to country j without invoking origin is
given by [Z(λPTAjk (φ)) − Z(λ
MFN
jk (φ))]. Thus, similar to what is shown in Demidova et
al (2012), there is endogenous sorting across firms between those that export under the
PTA and those that do not. Given that the expected profit from exporting is increasing
in firm ability, there exists some level of ability at which the expected profit is equal to
zero:
Πj(φ
∗) = 0 (16)
A firm with an ability above φ∗ will pay the fixed cost Fj and observe their product
attributes for market j because the expected profits cover the fixed cost of market re-
search. If a firm pays Fj but finds that all of their product attributes are too low to be
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profitably exported, they exit without exporting any products to country j.
Using equations (12) and (13) for a firm of ability φ∗, it can be shown that the
zero-profit cutoff for firm ability, equation (16), can be expressed as:
∫ λPTA(φ∗)
λMFN (φ∗)
[(
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)σ−1−1]σfjkz(λ)dλ+
∫
∞
λPTA(φ∗)
[(
λjk(φ)
λPTA(φ∗)
)σ−1−1]σfjkz(λ)dλ = Fj
(17)
The values λMFN (φ∗), and λPTA(φ∗) are implicitly defined in equation (17) as func-
tions of fixed costs and the elasticity of substitution (σ), and they are independent of φ∗.
These represent the minimum level of product attributes necessary to profitably export
to j while invoking the rules of origin and while not invoking the rules of origin.
Finally, using equations (12) and (13) the relative revenue between exporting product
k using the rules of origin and not using the rules of origin, for a firm of ability φ∗, can
be expressed as:
λPTA(φ∗) = ΘλMFN (φ∗) Θ = (
fjk + dj
fjk
)
1
σ−1 (
τPTAj p¯
β
x,k
τMFNj p
β
x,k
) (18)
Thus, the expected profit for a firm with ability φ can be expressed as:
Π(φ) =
∫ ΘλMFN (φ∗)
λMFN (φ∗)
[(
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)σ−1 − 1]σfjkz(λ)dλ+
∫
∞
ΘλMFN (φ∗)
[(
λjk(φ)
ΘλMFN (φ∗)
)σ−1 − 1]σfjkz(λ)dλ− Fj
(19)
3.7 Rules of Origin Liberalization
In this section, I show how liberalizing the rules of origin affects between-firm reallocation
of exports, and within-firm reallocation of product-level exports.
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Proposition 1: Rules of origin liberalization results in entry of new firms into the
export market.
Proof: See appendix
Liberalizing the rules of origin reduces p¯x,k, and thus results in a reduction in Θ, as
can be seen in equation (18). Equation (19) shows how a reduction in Θ changes the
zero profit cutoff for firm ability, and as a result, φ∗. First, reducing Θ results in the
expected profits from exporting without the rules of origin falling, as the upper limit
of the first integral falls. The reduction of Θ also results in the expected profits from
exporting with the rules of origin increasing because the lower limit of the second integral
falls. Further, the revenue from exporting under the rules of origin increases as well, as
the term
λjk(φ)
ΘλMFN (φ∗)
increases as Θ falls. Thus, given constant fixed costs, the overall
effect of a rules of origin liberalization is an increase in expected profits. An increase in
expected profits means lower productivity firms will be willing to pay the entry cost Fj .
Therefore, liberalizing the rules of origin results in entry of lower productivity firms. In
the appendix, I show this for the special case of Pareto distributed product attributes.
Proposition 2: Rules of origin liberalization results in an increase in the range of
products that incumbent firms export to country j.
To see this, the zero-profit condition for product attributes of a firm with productivity
φ and the same cutoff for a firm of ability φ∗ can be expressed as:
λMFNjk (φ) =
φ∗
φ
λMFNjk (φ
∗)
λPTAjk (φ) =
φ∗
φ
λPTAjk (φ
∗)
(20)
The fall in φ∗ that results from the rules of origin liberalization decreases the zero
profit cutoffs for product attributes for incumbent firms. Lower values of φ∗ mean the
average rival’s products are less attractive, thus product market competition falls. Since
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the terms λPTAjk (φ
∗) and λMFNjk (φ
∗) are implicitly defined as fuctions of the fixed costs
and elasticity of substitution, as show in equation (17), they are independent of φ∗. As
λMFNjk (φ) falls, some products that were not profitable to export prior to the rules of
origin change become profitable to export. Similarly, as λPTAjk (φ) falls, the firm is able
to export a wider range of its products using the rules of origin.
Proposition 3: Rules of origin liberalization results in an increase in product-level
revenue for products sold under the PTA for incumbent firms, but does not change the
product-level revenue for firms exporting without invoking the rules of origin.
This can be seen directly from the firm-product level revenue functions. A reduction
in p¯x,k increases the revenue for firms exporting product k under the rules of origin
because σ > 1. For firms exporting k without invoking the rules of origin, a change in
p¯x,k has no effect on revenue. Higher productivity firms will export product k using the
rules of origin, thus product-level revenue should increase more for high productivity
firms. The increase in product-level revenue for high ability firms outweighs the lack of
change in product-level revenue for low ability exporters, thus the average product-level
revenue for incumbent exporters will increase.
4 Empirical framework
In this section, I describe the data and outline the empirical framework used to evaluate
the model’s predictions.
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The main data source used in this project comes from The Bangladesh National Bureau
of Revenue (NBR).14 This panel data set contains information on the universe of export
transactions by Bangladeshi firms. Firm-level export value, export weight, and export
14Link to the data set, provided by the International Growth Center:
https://www.theigc.org/country/bangladesh/data/
23
destination are included in the data set, as is the of day the shipment at the HS8-digit
product level. I collapse the data to the annual level, as the change in the rules of origin
occurred on January 1st 2011. In the appendix of this paper, I show the results are
very similar when working with quarterly data.15 The sample used in this study covers
transactions between 2008 to 2013, which allows me to focus on the relevant time pe-
riod and include three pre-treatment years (2008-2010), and three post-treatment years
(2011-2013). Finally, I focus specifically on the change from a double-transformation to a
single-transformation rule of origin, which only applied to exporters of apparel. Apparel
products are defined as exports in HS heading 61 (Articles Of Apparel And Clothing
Accessories, Knitted Or Crocheted), and HS heading 62 (Articles Of Apparel And Cloth-
ing Accessories, Not Knitted Or Crocheted (woven)). There are 243 unique HS8-digit
products in these two categories. Over the sample time period, the EU accounts for
roughly 50% of annual export revenue.16
Bangladeshi apparel firms tend to be multi-product firms. Roughly 99% of firms
produce more than one product. Firm-level output is highly skewed towards its top
product, as shown in Table 3. The table shows information for firms that produce
between one and 10 products, and displays the share of total output attributed to each
product sold, descending from the firm’s largest to tenth largest product. As is evident
from the table, the average output share of the largest product much larger than the
next largest product.
A more detailed breakdown of the data is presented in Table 4. The table is broken
into two panels, one that displays the summary statistics for woven apparel products
and one that displays the summary statistics for knitted apparel products. Averages and
15I also examine the changes in monthly export revenue around the time of the policy change. I do
not see evidence of a substantial amount of anticipation of the policy change by exporting firms. See
Figure A1, in the Appendix.
16While I do not have access to firm-level import data, I show in the appendix that aggregate imports
of woven textiles do respond to the policy change. Using data on woven and knitted textile imports into
Bangladesh from the COMTRADE database, I find evidence that imports of woven textiles from China
increase following the revision to the rules of origin. Similarly, I find evidence that imports of woven
textile from other LDC countries fall dramatically post rules of origin revision.
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Table 3: Within-firm quantity share by product
Number of Products Sold by Firm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
R
an
k
of
P
ro
d
u
ct
in
F
ir
m
’s
O
u
tp
u
t
1 1.000 0.805 0.738 0.692 0.665 0.638 0.616 0.596 0.568 0.554
2 0.193 0.196 0.197 0.193 0.192 0.189 0.188 0.191 0.186
3 0.064 0.079 0.083 0.086 0.089 0.093 0.096 0.095
4 0.031 0.040 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.056 0.059
5 0.018 0.025 0.030 0.032 0.036 0.039
6 0.011 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.026
7 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.018
8 0.006 0.009 0.012
9 0.005 0.007
10 0.004
The columns of the table report the number of products sold by the firm, while the rows display
the share of firm-level output for each product. The rows are in descending order of product
rank in output share.
standard deviations are shown in the table. The statistics in the table are calculated
for 2010, the year prior to the change in the rules of origin. The easiest market for
Bangladeshi apparel firms to enter is the market for knitted apparel in the EU. This is
due to the reduced tariff rates faced by LDCs in the EU relative to the rest of the world,
and due to the relative ease of producing knitted textiles. The table shows that average
annual export revenue is highest for knitted products sold in the EU. The competition in
knitted products sold in the EU is also highlighted by the number of firms per product,
which is highest in this segment of the market. Across all segments of the market, firms
export between 4 and 7 products.
4.2 Endogeneity concerns and the triple-difference estimator
A major threat to the identification of the effect of the rules of origin revision in the EU
stems from the potential endogenous nature of the policy change itself. For example, EU
policy makers may have foresaw an increase in demand for apparel products from LDCs
for EU consumers and responded by revising the rules of origin for these products. As
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Table 4: Summary statistics
EU Average ROW Average Overall Average Obs
Woven
Firm-level revenue 922.7 1131.2 1033.2 3887
[2358.7] [3204.3] [2839.7]
Products per firm 5 5 5 4407
[7] [10] [9]
Firms per product 84 105 95 240
[252] [296] [274]
Knit
Firm-level revenue 1319.8 428.8 836.6 5528
[3182.2] [1249.9] [2382.8]
Products per firm 7 4 5 6071
[8] [7] [8]
Firms per product 167 121 144 223
[605] [466] [539]
This table displays the summary statistics for the sample. These statistics are calcu-
lated in 2010, the year prior to the rules of origin change. Woven products refers to
exports from HS heading 62, and knitted products refer to exports from HS heading
61. EU Exports refers to exports to EU member countries. Means are presented in
the table, with standard deviations in brackets below. Firm-level revenue is resported
in 100,000 Bangladeshi Taka.
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a result, any change in LDC exports of apparel products to the EU may be driven by
underlying changes in economic conditions or demand rather than the revision the to
rules of origin. In this situation, a difference-in-difference estimator, exploiting variation
in export destination before and after the policy change, will not recover an unbiased
estimate of the effect of the policy change.
In order to control for potential destination-specific demand shocks, I exploit ad-
ditional variation in the cost of producing textiles. As discussed earlier in this paper,
the double-transformation policy was particularly constricting for woven apparel prod-
ucts due to the capacity constraints in the woven textile production industry. I use
a triple-difference approach, exploiting variation in input-cost differentials across woven
and knitted apparel and export destination, before and after the EU policy change. With
this method, I am able to control for country-specific demand shocks. Given the global
nature of fashion trends, if woven apparel demand increased in the EU there was likely
an increase in demand for woven apparel in other import destinations as well. Thus,
product-specific shocks are also controlled for in the triple-difference estimator.
Figure 4 displays the trends in woven and knitted apparel export revenue, to EU
and the rest of the world (ROW), over the sample time period. The solid lines represent
the geometric mean annual firm-level export revenue for woven apparel exports. The
dashed lines represent the geometric mean annual firm-level export revenue for knitted
apparel exports. The gray lines indicate exports to the ROW, while black lines indicate
exports to the EU. The vertical line at Y ear = 2011 marks the year in which the rules
of origin for EU imports were changed. As is clear from the figure, exports of both
types of products sold to both destinations are trending up over the sample time frame.
This could be driven by a number of factors. For example, the recovery from the great
recession occurred within the sample time frame. Thus, the upward trend in the sales of
all apparel products, to both destinations could be a response to higher incomes in the
later half of the sample. The growth in exports of all products to all destinations over
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this time period indicates that Bangladeshi apparel firms were not capacity constrained.
If firms faced capacity constraints, exports of other products to other markets would
decline following the rules of origin liberalization as firms shifted their focus to woven
products sold to the EU. I examine this later in the empirical section of the paper.
Figure 5 displays the trends in the difference between the solid lines in Figure 4, and
the difference between the dashed lines in Figure 4 over time. Notably, the difference
trends in exports of knitted products does not appear to respond to the change in the
rules of origin in 2011. The identifying assumption needed in order for the estimates
produced by the triple-difference estimator to be consistent is that the pre-2011 trends
between these two groups should not be statistically different from each other. In other
words, the change in the difference between knitted garment exports to the EU and
ROW should mimic the change in the difference of woven garments in the absence of the
rules of origin revision. While this appears to be the case in Figure 5, in section 5.4 I
examine the validity of the identifying assumption more rigorously using an event-study
framework.
5 Empirical results
In this section, I present evidence of the effects of the rules of origin revision on Bangladeshi
apparel exporter’s margins of trade. I first show the effect on firm-product export rev-
enue, followed by evidence of the effect on two extensive margins of trade; the within-firm
product level extensive margin, and the between-firm extensive margin. For each margin
of trade, I provide evidence of the robustness of the results to increasingly demanding
sets of fixed effects that control for a number of potential confounding factors. I examine
the robustness of the identifying assumption using an event-study framework, as well as
falsification exercises.
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Trends in Export Revenue
Figure 4: This figure shows the trends in log average export value of firm-level exports
to the EU and ROW in knit and woven apparel over time. The solid lines represent
woven apparel exports (HS 62), while the dashed lines represent knitted apparel exports
(HS 61). The change in the Rules of Origin for EU countries (from double- to single-
transformation) occurred on January 1st, 2011 and is shown by the vertical line.
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Differenced Trends in Export Revenue
Figure 5: This figure shows trends in the difference between the average export value of
woven goods to EU countries and to the ROW (solid line) and the difference between
average export value of knitted goods to EU countries and the ROW (dashed line). The
change in the Rules of Origin for EU countries (from double- to single-transformation)
occurred on January 1st, 2011 and is shown by the vertical line.
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5.1 Firm-product revenue
I begin by examining the effect of the liberalization of the rules of origin governing
the access to the EU’s EBA arrangement on product level export revenue. To do this, I
construct three indicator variables: (i) an indicator for whether the product is woven (HS
62), (ii) an indicator for whether the product is exported to the EU, and (iii) an indicator
for whether the product was exported after the policy change in 2011. I then regress
the log of export revenue on a triple interaction of these three indicators, along with
a robust set of fixed effects. The triple-interaction term conducts the triple-difference
estimate discussed earlier. The empirical specification is as follows:
ln(rijkt) = β1(EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt) + φik + λjk + δjt + γkt + uijkt (21)
Here, rijkt is the reported export revenue from firm i, product k (HS 8 level), in
destination j (EU or the ROW), in year t.17 The parameter β1 captures the triple-
difference effect. Equation (21) based on equations (8) and (10) in section 3.4. Although
the reduced-form nature of the empirical model does not allow me to directly esti-
mate model parameters, equation (21) does allow me to test the validity of the model’s
predictions. I control flexibly for firm-product heterogeneity (φik) using firm-product
fixed effects, which accounts for firm ability and the average level of a firm’s product
attributes. The inclusion of destination-product fixed effects controls for the product at-
tributes parameter, destination j’s average expenditure on product k, and the jk price
index discussed in section 3. It also controls for the EUj ∗Wovenk interaction term in
a highly flexible manner. I control for destination-year and product-year fixed effects to
account for the EUj ∗Postt, and Wovenk ∗Postt interaction. Using interacted fixed ef-
fects to control for double-interaction terms in a triple-difference-in-differences model is
done in Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010), where it is referred to as the “unrestrictive”
17The results using PPML estimation, rather than a log-linear model are similar in magintude and
statistical significance.
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Table 5: Firm-Product Export Revenue
All Firms Incumbents
All Multi-Product Multi-Product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18***
(0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053)
Observations 182,094 136,700 83,159 80,711 80,703
R-squared 0.309 0.620 0.617 0.616 0.710
Firm FE X
Dest-Prod FE X X X X X
Dest-Year FE X X X X X
Prod-Year FE X X X X X
Firm-Prod FE X X X
Firm-Prod-Dest FE X
This table displays the results from estimating equation (21). The first four columns
use all firms in the data. Columns (4) and (5) restrict the sample to contain only multi-
product firms. Errors allow for clustering at the HS8 product level in all columns.
triple-difference model. Finally, to account for potential correlation in error error term,
I allow for clustering at the product level.
Table 5 displays the results of estimating equation (21). Starting with column (1),
I estimate the rules of origin revision increased firm-product level exports by roughly
15%. The effect size is calculated using the methods outlined in Kennedy (1981) for
interpreting coefficients on dichotomous variables with a logged dependent variable.18
The 17% increase, when evaluated at the 2010 average product-level export revenue (as
shown in Table 4) is roughly equivalent to an increase in export revenue of 16 million
Bangladeshi Taka, or $233,000.19 The results in columns (1) and (2) are estimated using
a sample of all firms. This includes firms that entered the market after the policy change,
as well as firms that were already exporting product k to destination j prior to the policy
18The interpretation of the coefficient on a dichotomous regressor on a logged dependent variable is
done using the methods in Kennedy (1981). This involves calculating [exp(βˆ)/exp(0.5(Vˆ (βˆ))− 1] where
Vˆ (βˆ) is the estimated variance of βˆ.
19The exchange rate of Bangladeshi Taka to USD on December 31st, 2010 was 0.0142 to 1. This makes
the export revenue gain equal to roughly $223,000.
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change.
Columns (3) through (5) present the results of estimate equation (21) using a sample
of incumbent firms only. Here, an incumbent is defined as a firm that exported the same
product to the same destination during the double-transformation period (pre-2011)
and during the single-transformation period (post-2011). This sample excludes brand
new exporters, that only entered the export market post-2011, and exiters who left the
market after 2011. Column (3) presents the results for all such incumbent firms, while
column (4) presents the results for multi-product incumbents. Multi-product firms are
defined as firms that export at least two products each year. In both cases, the effect
of the rules of origin liberalization on firm-product level export revenue was an 18%
increase.
Finally, the last column of Table 5 displays the results of estimating equation (21)
using a sub-sample of firms that exported the same product, to the same destination, each
year. This is the balanced panel. I then control for firm-product-destination fixed effects,
rather than firm-product and destination-product fixed effects. Using this definition of
incumbent firms and this robust set of fixed effects, the estimate of β1 in equation (21)
uses variation within a firm-product-destination group over time, and excludes any firm-
products, or product-destination pairs that entered or exited within this time frame. I
estimate moving to a single-transformation policy resulted in a 19.5% increase in export
revenue for this sample of firms.
5.2 Product-level extensive margin
Next, I analyze the effect of the rules of origin revision on the number of products sold
by incumbent firms. Here, incumbents are defined as firms that exported any product
to a given destination in the pre-2011 and post-2011 periods.
I collapse the data to the firm-destination-year level for this analysis. Then for
each firm-destination-year group, I count the number of exported woven and knitted
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products. I then impute zeros for all missing firm-destination-year pairs. In other words,
if a firm-destination-year pair is missing from the collapsed sample, I assume that no
products were exported from the firm to the destination in that year. This assumption
is reasonable as the data set contains the universe of firm-level transactions. This is
done in order to estimate the following non-linear regression model using a (pseudo)
Poisson maximum likelihood estimator.20 The Poisson model requires the potential for
zero outcomes, and given the count nature of the dependent variable, this model best
describes the data generating process.21 The empirical model is as follows:
NumProdijkt = exp{β1EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt + φij + λjk + δjkt + γkt + ǫijkt} (22)
where, NumProdijkt is the number of woven or knit products (k) exported by firm
i, to destination j, in year t. ǫijkt is an error term, which I allow to cluster at the firm
level. I also test cluster bootstrapped standard errors, as is recommended by Puhani
(2012). The subscript k in equation (22) represents either woven or knit, rather than
the HS 8 level product. Thus, the dependent variable is the expected log count of the
number of HS 8 level products, within an HS 2 heading (HS 61 is knit, HS 62 is woven).
I control for firm-destination fixed effects, destination-year fixed effects, product-year
fixed effects, and destination-product fixed effects.
The results of estimating equation (22) are presented in Table 6. Columns (1) present
the results when using all incumbents, and columns (2) and (3) present the results when
using only multi-product incumbents in the estimating sample. In all columns, the
20I use the pseudo Poisson estimator because it does not require the underlying distribution to strictly
follow the Poisson distribution. See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
21The results from the sample ignoring zeros are very similar in magnitude and statistical significance.
The reason for including zeros is to better capture the data generating process. It is possible to estimate
a zero-truncated Poisson (ZTP) regression model, however, the distributional assumption that a zero
value of the dependent variable cannot occur does not reflect the true data generating process, making
this model relatively unattractive for the purposes here. That being said, the results are similar when a
ZTP model is used rather than a Poisson model.
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Table 6: Number of products per incumbent firm
(1) (2) (3)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant 2.19*** 2.19*** 2.26***
(0.003) (0.035) (0.035)
Errors cluster bootstrap bootstrap
Observations 36,781 36,781 31,569
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table displays the results from estimating equation (22). All columns include firm-
destination, destination-year, product-year, and destination-product fixed effects. The
first two columns use a sample of all incumbent firms, while column (3) restricts the
estimating sample to multi-product incumbents. Errors allow for clustering at the firm
level in the first column, and are cluster bootstrapped (with 1,000 replications) at the
firm level in the second two columns.
revision of the rules of origin policy increased the expected log counts of the number of
products sold by incumbents by 0.09. When using the methods described in Sang et al.
(2017) this estimate corresponds to roughly a 9% increase in the number of products
exported.22 When evaluated at the pre-2011 mean, this is equivalent to an increase of
roughly 0.5 products. To estimate the precision of the estimates in Table 6, I use the
methods described in Puhani (2012) where bootstrapping is recommended for inference
in non-linear difference-in-difference models. Column (2) and (3) show the results when
errors are cluster bootstrapped at the firm-level.
5.3 Firm-level extensive margin
Next, I estimate the effect of the rules of origin revision on firm-level entry. To do this,
I begin by counting the number of firms exporting at each HS 8 level product to the EU
and the ROW. I then create a balanced panel for all product-destination pairs in each
22The magnitude of the effect of interacted dichotomous variables in the PPML model is done using
the methods outlined in Shang et al., (2017), or as the difference-in-difference-in-semielasticities.
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Table 7: Number of Firms
(2) (3) (4)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt 0.08** 0.08** 0.08*
(0.031) (0.034) (0.045)
Constant 6.60*** 6.60*** 6.58***
(0.003) (0.400) (0.179)
errors cluster bootstrap bootstrap
Observations 2,544 2,544 2,460
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table displays the results from estimating equation (23). All columns include
destination-product, destination-year, and product-year fixed effects. The first column
use a sample of all incumbent firms, while column (2) and (3) restrict the estimating
sample to multi-product incumbents. Errors allow for clustering at the HS-8 product
level in the first column, and are cluster bootstrapped at the product level in the second
two columns.
year, imputing zeros in situations where no firm exported a product to the destination
in a given year. Most products have at least one firm exporting them to the destination
market, there are only 44 product-destinations that do not appear in each year. This is
done in order to estimate a Pseudo-Poisson model, where zero outcomes are required.
The empirical model is as follows:
NumFirmsjkt = exp{β1EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt + γjk + δkt + λjt + ǫjkt} (23)
where, NumFirmsjkt is the number of firms exporting product k (HS8-level) to des-
tination j in year t. I include destination-product fixed effects, destination-year fixed
effects, and product-year fixed effects to control for all double-interactions and dummy
variables.
Table 7 presents the results of estimating equation (23). The first column present the
results using all firms in the estimating sample, while the second two columns restrict
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the sample to only multi-product firms. Across the specifications in Table 7, the liber-
alization of the rules of origin resulted in an increase in the expected log counts of the
number of firms exporting woven products to the EU by 0.08. Using the estimates from
column (2), the effect of the rules of origin liberalization corresponds to an increase of
roughly seven firms.23 Standard errors presented in Table 7 either allow for clustering at
the product level, or are cluster bootstrapped at the product level, as is recommended
by Puhani (2012).
6 Robustness
In this section, I test the robustness of the results presented in the previous section. I
examine the underlying assumption that there are no differential pre-trends using an
event-study framework and a falsification test.
6.1 Event-study framework
The identifying assumption underlying the estimates presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7 is
that there are no differential pre-trends. This identifying assumption is needed for both
the log-linear model used to estimate product level export revenue, as well as the PPML
models used to estimate equations (22) and (23). The difference between the common
trends assumptions is that PPML requires a multiplicative common trend rather than
a linear one (Ciani and Fisher, 2013). This means the difference between the outcome
for woven products sold to the EU and the ROW prior to the rules of origin change
should not be statistically different from the difference between the outcome for knitted
products sold to the EU and the ROW prior to the rules of origin change.
While the identifying assumption is not testable, evidence consistent with its valid-
ity can be provided by examining the pre-treatment trends. I estimate the response of
23Again, the interpretation of these interacted effects is based on the recommendations in Shang et al
(2017).
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product level export revenue, the number of products exported per firm, and the num-
ber of firms per exported product to the rules of origin revision using an event-study
framework. Here, rather than restricting the effect of the policy change on the outcome
variables to remain constant in the pre-2011 and post-2011 periods, I allow it to vary by
year. The estimating equations are identical to equations (21) through (23), but all of
the Postt indicators are replaced with indicators for each year.
E(Yijkt) = f(
T∑
t=1
βt(EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Y eart),Γijkt, uijkt) (24)
In equation (24), Yijkt refers to either product-level export revenue (in logs), the num-
ber of firms per product, or the number of products per firm. Γijkt is a vector of interacted
dummy variables and fixed effects. In all specifications I allow for destination-year fixed
effects. In the number of firms extensive margin regression I include product-destination
fixed effects, and in the number of products extensive margin and product-level intensive
margin regressions I include firm-product fixed effects. The full specifications are avail-
able in Table A6 in the Appendix. The right-hand side of the equation (24) depends on
the estimation procedure used. For product-level export revenue f() is a linear model,
while for the two extensive margin outcomes f() is a non-linear model and (24) is esti-
mated using PPML. The parameters of interested are the βts. These are the estimated
triple-difference effect for each year.
The results are presented in graphical form in Figure 6. In the figure I display the
estimate of the βts from equation (24) along with the 95% confidence interval around
the estimate. Each panel of the figure displays the results for a different outcome. In
each panel, the year prior to the rules of origin revision is normalized to zero. As can be
seen in the figure, the difference between woven exports to the EU and woven exports
to the ROW is not statistically different from the difference between knitted exports to
the EU and knitted exports to the ROW prior to the policy change for any outcome
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Event-Study Framework
Figure 6: This figure show the estimate, and 95% confidence interval, of the parameter
on the triple-interaction term from equations (22) through (24), where the Postt variable
has been replaced in all instances with year dummy variables. The year 2010 has been
normalized to zero. Regression output is available in Table A6.
variable.
Figure 6 not only provides evidence consistent with the identifying assumption, but
also shows there are dynamic effects in response to the liberalization of the rules of
origin. For the entry of new firms, this is not surprising. It may take time for firms to
enter due to the fixed market entry cost, associated with market research or connecting
with distributors. The slow response of the number of products sold by incumbent
firms may also be driven by the fixed costs of supplying individual products. Exporting
new products may require learning about general product standards, or product-specific
advertising, for example.
The response of firm-product level export revenue for incumbent firms is immedi-
ate. Theoretically, incumbent firms should have already paid the various fixed costs
associated with exporting a given product, thus this effect of the rules of origin liber-
alization on product level export revenue is expected. In the Table A6, I show that
the inclusion of more restrictive fixed effects does result in the effect in 2011 becoming
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statistically insignificant. One explanation for the slow response could be that there are
costs associated with switching input suppliers. If it is costly to search over the set of
intermediate input prices, liberalizing the rules of origin could result in incumbent firms
re-optimizing where they source their inputs, and this re-optimization may take time.
If some firms were exporting woven products without invoking the rules of origin, the
delayed effect could be explained by the rules of origin fixed cost as well. If it takes time
for firms to learn how to navigate the documentation process, the effects of a rules of
origin liberalization would not result in immediate revenue gains.
6.2 Falsification Test
Next, I examine the robustness of the results presented in the previous sections. To
do this, I conduct a falsification exercise that creates a placebo change to the rules of
origin associated with the EBA in 2010. I then limit my estimating sample to the years
2008, 2009, and 2010 and re-estimate the triple difference model for all three margins.24
The value of export revenue, the number of products sold per firm, and the number of
exporting firms should not respond to this placebo policy timing. Recovering a similar
estimate under a placebo policy would be consistent with a failure of the parallel trends
assumption.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 8. In all cases, the response
of woven products sold to the EU under the placebo post period are not statistically
different from zero at traditional levels. Furthermore, the estimates of the treatment
effect under the placebo treatment are statistically different from the actual estimates.
This is shown in the row titled T-stat.
24I also test a placebo Post variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2009, and zero otherwise.
The results are very similar to what is shown in the paper.
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Table 8: Placebo timing
(1) (2) (3)
Intensive Product Level Extensive Firm Level Extensive
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt -0.011 -0.057 0.026
(0.051) (0.035) (0.028)
Constant 15.60*** 2.12*** 6.41***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
T-stat 3.35 4.20 1.93
Observations 57,198 17,456 1,303
R-squared 0.664
Firm-prod FE x x
Dest-prod FE x x x
Dest-year FE x x x
Prod-year FE x x x
errors product firm product
This table displays the results of estimating equations the triple difference model for each out-
come. Each column only uses a sample from 2008-2010, and the Postt variable is redefined to
take the value of 1 if the year is 2010. T-stat presents the t-statistic of a t-test for whether the
placebo coefficient is different from the actual coefficient.
7 Additional within-firm responses
In this section, I examine additional within-firm responses to the rules of origin liberal-
ization. In particular, I examine whether the expansion of product scope for incumbent
firms came at the expense of sales of existing products. Then I examine the potential
for capacity constraints within Bangladeshi apparel exporters. Finally, I examine the
response of product quality and quality-adjusted prices of products following the rules
of origin revision.
7.1 Effect by product ranking
The model predicts that they entry of new firms, and new products by incumbent firms,
reduces the average product market competition because the products that are intro-
duced are less desirable than the products already in the market prior to the rules of
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origin revision. As a result, incumbent firms are able to introduce new products without
cannibalizing sales of their existing products. I show that incumbent firms introduced
new products in section 5.2. Here, I show that the introduction of new products did not
reduce the export revenue of exiting products sold by these firms.
I first calculate each products share of firm output prior to 2011. I calculate product
share within HS2-destination levels, allowing me to determine each firm’s best selling
woven and knit product to the EU and the ROW prior to the rules of origin change.
Next, I estimate equation (21) using sub-samples containing only the best selling product,
second best selling product, and so on. The results of this exercise are presented in Table
9.
Table 9: Sales of existing products by rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-2011 product rank: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6thand above
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt∗ 0.25*** 0.39*** 0.30** 0.31** 0.40* 0.18
(0.073) (0.104) (0.147) (0.153) (0.208) (0.145)
Constant 16.87*** 16.10*** 15.72*** 15.47*** 15.30*** 15.15***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.016)
Observations 29,100 17,307 10,043 6,584 4,283 11,724
R-squared 0.747 0.674 0.628 0.624 0.633 0.603
This table presents the results of estimating equation (21) using sub-samples of products
within incumbent firms. Each column represents the effects of the rules of origin revision
on the firms 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and ≥6th best selling products prior to 2011.
The first column of Table 9 shows how firms best selling products (prior to 2011) re-
sponded to the rules of origin revision. Columns (2) through (5) repeat this for products
ranked two through five. The last column of the table displays the results for prod-
ucts ranked six and up. I group these products together because samples sizes quickly
become too small when treated separately. Revenue gains for firms top four products
increased by between 28% and 47%, while export revenue of products ranked sixth and
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above did not increase by a statistically significant amount.25 The results indicate the
export revenue of firms best-selling products did not come at the expense of lower-selling
products.
7.2 Capacity Constraints
In the theoretical model, I assume that firms set prices for each product and destination
market independently. This assumption is frequently employed in theoretical models of
trade with heterogeneous firms.26 However, if firms are capacity constrained and face
increasing marginal costs of production, a positive demand shock for one product may
result affect sales of other products. This assumption has empirical implications as well.
If Bangladeshi apparel exporters are capacity constrained, the increased demand for
woven products in the EU may also affect prices, and therefore sales, of other products.
The result of the triple-difference estimates may be upward biased if sales of other
products fell as a result of the revision to the double-transformation rule of origin in the
EU.
To examine this, I estimate the following event-study specifications for incumbent
product revenue:
ln(rijkt) = φik + γjk + δjt +
t=2013∑
t=2008
βt(Wovenk ∗ Y eart) + ǫijkt, if j 6= EU, (25)
and,
ln(rijkt) = φik + γjk + δkt +
t=2013∑
t==2008
βt(EUj ∗ Y eart) + ǫijkt, if k 6=Woven. (26)
25Effect size is calculated using the methods in Kennedy (1981). This involves calculating
[exp(βˆ)/exp(0.5(Vˆ (βˆ))− 1] where Vˆ (βˆ) is the estimated variance of βˆ.
26For example, see: Melitz (2003); Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011).
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In equation (30), I estimate how sales of woven products sold to non-EU countries
responded after the EU’s rules of origin revision. In equation (31), I examine how the
sales of knitted apparel products change in the EU after the rules of origin revision.
If apparel firms are capacity constrained, the positive demand shock for woven apparel
in the EU will result in a decline in sales of woven products to the ROW and/or knit
products sold in the EU.
The results of estimating equations (30) and (31) are presented graphically in Figure
7. The panel on the left shows the event-study results for equation (30) and the right
panel displays the results of the event-study specified in equation (31). While exports of
woven products sold to non-EU countries do appear to decline following the 2011 rules
of origin revision, the decline is small in magnitude and not statistically different from
zero. There does not appear to be a discernable decline in the sales of knit products
to the EU following the rules of origin revision either. The results here indicate that
Bangladeshi apparel exporters are not capacity constrained, and that they were able to
satisfy the positive demand shock for woven apparel in the EU without affecting sales
of other products to other destinations.
7.3 Prices and product quality
Rules of origin liberalization allows final goods exporters to search over a larger set of
intermediate input prices during sourcing decisions. As a result, the price of final goods
fall. In this section, I explore how prices of apparel products responded to the revision
of the double-transformation policy.
First, I estimate equation (21) using log price as a dependent variable. Column (1) of
Table 10 shows that the rules of origin revision increased prices by roughly three percent.
This is at odds with what is predicted by the theory. Even after accounting for the fact
that the results in column (1) combine the effect on prices of enterants and incumbents
I find that prices increase following the rules of origin revision. Column (2) presents the
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Capacity Constraints
Figure 7: This figure show the estimate, and 95% confidence interval, of the parameter
on the βt’s from equations (30) through (31), where the Postt variable has been replaced
in all instances with year dummy variables. The year 2010 has been normalized to zero.
results when using only incumbent firms.
Quality upgrading is a potential explanation for prices rising following the rules of
origin revision. Firms may be able to upgrade the quality of their exported apparel
products by importing higher quality textiles following the rules of origin revision. To
address this, I construct a measure of product quality based on Khandelwal et al. (2013),
which uses the functional form of the utility function. Equation (25) presents a slight
modification to the utility function presented in section 3.2 that allows for a factor
specific to product quality qijk(ω):
Cjk = [
J∑
i=1
∫
ω∈Ωijk
(qijk(ω)λijk(ω)cijk(ω))
ρdω]
1
ρ (27)
Here, q represents the part of product attributes λ that corresponds to product
quality. I take this step because λ is a term that is more general than product quality,
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thus specifying a parameter that specifically captures quality is necessary.
The demand for product k, with attributes λjk and quality qjk, in destination j, from
a firm of productivity φ is given by:
x(φ, λjk) = p
−σ
jk
1
σ
EjkP
σ−1
jk χ
σλσjkq
σ−1
jk (28)
where χ is a constant and σ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties. By taking
logs and rearranging the demand equation, the quality for each firm-product-destination-
year can be estimated.
x˜ijkt + σp˜ijkt = λjk + γjt + δkt + φi + ηijkt (29)
Here, tildes represent the natural log of variables. Destination-product fixed effects
control for the time-invariant component of product attributes, destination-year and
product-year fixed effects control for trends in quality, and firm fixed effects control for
overall firm efficiency. Estimated quality can be recovered from the residual variation in
equation (27) and the elasticity of substitution: qijkt = e
(ηijkt/(σ−1)). I use an estimate
of σ = 3, which is the median estimate from Broda et al. (2006) for HS 61 and 62
products.
The results from estimating equation (21) using product quality as a dependent
variable are presented in column (3) of Table 10. I find evidence the rules of origin liber-
alization resulted in upgrades to woven apparel products sent to the EU. The magnitude
of the effect is relatively small (roughly 10% of a standard deviation).
Next, I analyze the effect of the rules of origin revision on quality-adjusted prices.
Column (4) of Table 10 presents the results of estimating equation (21) using the log
of quality-adjusted price as a dependent variable. Column (5) presents the results of
estimating the same regression on a sub-sample containing only incumbent firms. In
both cases, quality-adjusted prices fell by roughly 5 percent after the rules of origin
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revision.
Table 10: Prices and product quality
price quality quality adjusted price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt 0.03*** 0.02* 0.08*** -0.04** -0.05***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.03) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 136,700 83,159 83,159 136,700 83,159
R-squared 0.730 0.719 0.474 0.680 0.665
This table displays the results from estimating equation (21) using log price, quality,
and log quality-adjusted price as dependent variables. Columns (2) and (5) restrict
the sample to incumbent firms only. All columns contain firm-product, destination-
product, destination-year, and product-year fixed effects. Errors allow for clustering at
the product level in all columns.
8 Industry Responses
In this section, I examine how the rules of origin revision influence the composition of
the apparel export industry in Bangladesh. I first examine how market shares adjusted
across entrants, incumbents, and exiting firms. Then, focusing on incumbent firms, I
analyze the response of market shares across incumbent firms of different productivity.
8.1 Market share reallocation
In section 5 I document the growth in exports of woven products sold in the EU fol-
lowing the rules of origin liberalization under the EBA. In this section, I analyze how
the move from a double-transformation to single-transformation policy influenced the
redistribution of market shares across firms in the industry.
Following Khandewal, Schott, and Wei (2013), I decompose export growth into one
intensive margin, and two extensive margins. The intensive margin is composed of
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incumbent firms, which are defined as firms that exported the same HS8-level product
to the same destination (EU or ROW) before and after the policy change. The extensive
margins are composed of entering and exiting firms, which consist of firms that began
exporting an HS8-level product to a destination after the policy change and stopped
exporting an HS8-level product to a destination after the policy change, respectively.
I then break the two extensive margins down further. Within enterants I define
“destination adders” as firms that exported a HS8-level product during the pre- and post-
policy change period, but began exporting the HS8-level product to a new destination
after the policy change. Next, I define “product adders” as firms that exported a product
to a destination during the pre- and post-policy change period, but began exporting a
new HS8-level product to the destination after the policy change. Finally, I define a
group of firms called “brand new” firms. These firms began exporting a new HS8-level
product to a new destination after the policy change. Exiters are decomposed similarly,
expect rather than adding products of destinations, the firms “destination droppers”
drop destinations, “product droppers” drop products, and “complete exiters” drop a
product-destination pair after the policy change.
For each of these margins (m), I calculate the quantity and value market share across
destination-products (jk) in each year. Again, following Khandewal, Schott, and Wei
(2013), these market shares are defined by:
Φmjkt = (
∑
i∈m
Yijkt/
∑
m
∑
i
Yijkt) (30)
where, Y refers to either value or quantity of export shipments. I then estimate the
following triple-difference regression model for each margin separately:
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Φjkt = α0 + β1(EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt) + β2(EUj ∗Wovenk) + β3(Wovenk ∗ Postt)+
β4(EUj ∗ Postt) + β5(EUj ∗Wovenk) + β6EUj + β7Wovenk + β8Postt + ǫjkt
(31)
allowing for errors to cluster at the HS8-level. The estimates of β1 from estimating
equation (29) for all nine margins are presented in Table 11, and the full results are
presented in Table A4 in the Appendix.
Table 11: Total Market Share Change
Quantity Share Value Share
Incumbent -0.032 -0.027
Total Enterants 0.13*** 0.12***
Dest Adders 0.002 0.001
Prod Adders 0.10*** 0.11***
Brand New 0.026 0.013
Total Exit -0.096*** -0.094**
Prod Dropper -0.058 -0.060
Dest Dropper 0.001 0.0003
Complete Exit -0.04* -0.034*
Net Entry 0.032 0.027
This table displays the results from estimating equation (29)
for each margin, shown in equation (28), separately. The full
table can be found in the Appendix (Table A4).
Unlike Khandewal, Schott, and Wei (2013), I do not find evidence that the rules
of origin liberalization had a statistically significant effect on incumbent market share.
That is, the market share of incumbents exporting woven products to EU countries did
not change by a statistically significant amount following the policy change. I do find,
however, that the market share of enterants who begin selling a woven product to the
EU after the policy change increases by 13 percentage points. Within enterants, product
adders contribute 77 percent to this increase. This indicates that the main margin of
adjustment among enterants comes from firms that were already exporting to the EU
and added a woven product after the policy change.
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I find evidence that the market share for exiting firms declines by rough 9.6 percent-
age points more in the woven-EU market relative to other product-destination markets.
Among exiters, the market share of compete exiters is the only marginally significant
contributor. This indicates that the firms that stopped selling woven products to the EU
after the policy change didn’t continue to export knit products to the EU, and didn’t
continue to export woven products to the ROW. The last row of Table 11 shows the
change in net entry, which is not statistically significant.
8.2 Incumbent market share reallocation
The evidence provided in Table 11 indicates that incumbent firms did not lose market
share to enterants, however market share may have been reallocated within incumbents.
In particular, the model predicts that after a rules of origin liberalization market share
should be reallocated toward higher productivity incumbent firms. To examine this, I
use the number of products a firm exports as a proxy measurement for firm productivity
because it is positively correlated with firm productivity in the model.27
For each incumbent firm, I determine the average number of products exported per
year during the double-transformation period (pre-2011). I then break this measure into
quartiles. Next, I follow a similar procedure outlined above, calculating the product-
destination level market share for each quartile. I then estimate the triple-difference
model in equation (29) using the market share of each quartile as a dependent variable.
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 12.
I find evidence that market share of firms in the highest quartile of productivity,
measured roughly using the number of products exported, increased by 9 percentage
points after the rules of origin liberalization. The lack of reallocation effects at the low
end of the productivity distribution is surprising. However, firms at the low end of the
productivity distribution may offer products of a lower quality than firms at the high
27Measuring firm productivity using the number of products firm’s export is also done in Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2011).
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Table 12: Incumbent Share Change
Quantity Share Value Share
Quartile 1 0.02 0.01
Quartile 2 -0.04 -0.03
Quartile 3 -0.07* -0.07*
Quartile 4 0.09** 0.09**
This table displays the results of estimating equa-
tion (29) for each quartile of productivity, mea-
sured by the number of products exported in the
double-transformation period. The full table is in
the appendix (Table A5).
end. Thus, there may be less competition between low and high productivity firms and
more competition between firms at the high end of the productivity distribution.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, I show how restrictive rules of origin act as barriers to market access for
firms in LDCs. Exploiting technical differences in the production of different types of
textiles, and a revision to the rules of origin governing preferential access to the EU
market for apparel producers in LDCs, I find rules of origin not only restrict firm entry
into the export market, but also reduce the range of products they sell, and the average
export revenue they earn per product.
The results indicate that rules of origin can have a sizable effect on the flow of trade.
In particular, I show that in the context of a labor-abundant country (like Bangladesh)
firms that must rely on capital-intensive inputs are put at a disadvantage under strict
rules of origin. Given the small amount of textile production in Bangladesh, the po-
tential losses from this policy change for Bangladeshi woven textiles producers is likely
small, although data limitations restrict me from directly analyzing this. From a policy
perspective, the results shed light on an under-studied trade barrier that is typically
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embedded within preferential trade agreements. Policy makers attempting to improve
conditions in developing countries through trade policy may be able to affect outcomes
without lowering traditional barriers like tariffs or quotas by adjusting the rules of origin.
While this study focuses on the apparel industry, the theoretical model offers insight
into how firms in other industries may respond to rules of origin. For example, the
discussion surrounding the potential transition from the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) to the US-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) agreement has highlighted
the restrictions on the rules of origin for automobile manufacturing.28 U.S. policy makers
hope that requiring more within-region content in automobiles will result in car manu-
factures using more American made components. The model in this paper shows that
firms may simply choose to source inputs from lower cost suppliers and face higher tariffs
than satisfy restrictive rules of origin. Future work should formally analyze this in the
context of renegotiated trade agreements.
Lastly, in this paper I offer additional context to debates regarding the trade rela-
tionships between high- and low-income countries. Flentø and Ponte (2017) note that
while there is a general consensus in trade and development policy circles that trade
negotiations between developed and LDCs should aim to reduce trade barriers for ex-
porters in LDCs there is less consensus on how this should be achieved. The results of
this study show that revising rules of origin is a viable option within this debate.
28See: https://piie.com/newsroom/short-videos/toughening-naftas-rules-origin-could-backfire
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10 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
I assume product attributes have a Pareto distribution, Z(λ) = 1− ( λλmin )
−k. With the
minimum level of product attributes necessary to cover the fixed costs given by λ∗jk(φ
∗),
the Pareto distribution takes the form: Z(λjk) = 1 − (
λjk
λMFN
jk
(φ∗)
)−k. Here, I retain the
usual assumption that k > σ−1 required for trade flows to be finite. Proof of Proposition
1: Equation (19) can be rewritten as:
σfjk
∫ λPTA(φ∗)
λMFN (φ∗)
[(
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)σ−1 − 1](
∂(1− (
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)−k)
∂λ
)∂λ+
σfjk
∫
∞
λPTA(φ∗)
[(
λjk(φ)
λPTA(φ∗)
)σ−1 − 1](
∂(1− (
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)−k)
∂λ
)∂λ− Fj
(A1)
Working in parts, the first half of the equation results in:
kσfjk
∫ θλMFN (φ∗)
λMFN (φ∗)
[(
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)σ−1 − 1](
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)−k−1∂λ (A2)
Where, λPTA(φ∗) = θλMFN (φ∗) from equation (18) in the text. Equation (A2) can
be rearranged and integrated into:
σfjk[
(
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)σ−k−1
σ − k − 1
+
(
λjk(φ)
λMFN (φ∗)
)−k
k
]
θλMFN (φ∗)
λMFN (φ∗)
(A3)
When evaluated at the limits, this becomes:
σfjk[
θσ−k−1
σ − k − 1
+
θ−k
k
] + σfjk[
1
σ − k − 1
+
1
k
] (A4)
Defining, σ[ 1σ−k−1 +
1
k ] = C to save notation, equation (A6) can be expressed as:
σfjk[
θσ−k−1
σ − k − 1
+
θ−k
k
] + fjkC (A5)
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Next, working from the second half of equation (A1), produces:
σ(fjk + dj)[
(
λjk(φ)
θλMFN (φ∗)
)σ−k−1
σ − k − 1
+
(
λjk(φ)
θλMFN (φ∗)
)−k
k
]∞θλMFN (φ∗) (A6)
Where the identify in equation (18) has been used again to replace λPTA(φ). When
(A6) is evaluated at it’s limits, the resulting expression is:
− (fjk + dj)C (A7)
Combining equations (A4) and (A6) results in the expression:
σfjk[
θσ−k−1
σ − k − 1
+
θ−k
k
]− djC (A8)
From equation (18) in the text, θ is an increasing function of p¯x,k. A relaxation of
the rules of origin reduces p¯x,k. Thus, to see how Π(φ
∗) responds to a revision of the
rules of origin, it is sufficient to show that the derivative of (A8) with respect to θ is
positive. Differentiating (A8) with respect to θ results in:
∂Π
∂θ
= σfjk[θ
σ−k−2 − θ−k−1] (A9)
The expression in the brackets is greater than zero if and only if:
1
θk+2−σ
>
1
θk+1
⇐⇒ θk+1 > θk+2−σ
Because σ > 1, this is true. An increase in Θ results in an increase in Π(φ∗), and
because expected profits are strictly increasing in firm ability, this results in an increase in
φ∗. Thus, because ∂Θ∂p¯x,k > 0, liberalizing the rules of origin (i.e. reducing p¯x,k) reduces
the zero-profit cutoff for firm ability. Intuitively, a relaxation of the rules of origin
increases the expected profits from exporting to country j for all firms by reducing the
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prices they charge, and increasing the probability of drawing desirable enough product
attributes in market j. Thus, lower ability firms are able to enter the export market.
10.2 Higher frequency data
I estimate the main regression equations in the text using higher frequency data. I first
show the triple difference effect graphically in Figure A1, which uses monthly, rather than
annual data. On the y-axis I plot the difference between (EU Woven - ROW Woven)
and (EU Knit - ROW Knit), and on the x-axis is the time. There does not appear to
be anticipation of the rules of origin revision by Bangladeshi exporters. If there were,
Figure A1 who show an increase in triple-difference effect in the months leading up to
the rules of origin revision. The dashed line represents when the rules of origin were
revised. Next, I estimate equations (22)-(24) in the text with quarterly data. The results
are presented in Table A1. The results are very similar to the results in the text.
Table A1: Quarterly Data
(1) (2) (3)
Export Revenue Number of products per firm Number of firms per product
Wovenk 0.23**
(0.103)
EUj ∗Wovenk 0.00 -0.01
(0.043) (0.056)
EUj ∗ Postt -0.24*** -0.28***
(0.024) (0.021)
EUj ∗Wovenk -0.79***
(0.094)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18**
(0.046) (0.037) (0.039)
Observations 189,724 130,918 10,153
R-squared 0.500
This table displays the results of estimating the main regression models in the paper using quarterly, rather than
annual data. The first column displays the results for the intensive margin, and is comparable to column (3) in Table
5. It includes firm-product, destination-product, product-time, destination-time fixed effects. Here time, refers to a
year-quarter. The second column displays the within-firm extensive margin, and is comparable to column (3) of Table
6. It includes firm-destination, and time fixed effects. Column 3 displays the across-firm extensive margin, and is
comparable to column (3) of Table 7. It includes destination-product, and time fixed effects.
61
Figure A1: This figure displays the difference between woven exports sent to the EU
and woven exports sent to the ROW, and knit exports sent to the Eu and knit exports
sent to the ROW. This is the triple-difference estimate. The data is at the monthly
level. The dashed vertical line represents when the single-transformation policy went
into effect.
10.3 Effect on Imports
To explore how imports of textiles responded to the revision of the rules of origin, I
collect data from COMTRADE on woven and knitted textiles imported into Bangladesh
over the relevant time period (2008-2013). Figure A2 displays the top ten sources for
textiles used in the production of apparel in Bangladesh in the pre-2011 years. I do not
have data on firm-level imports of textiles. I then use the COMTRADE data to estimate
the following difference-in-difference model:
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log(importjkt) = β1(Wovenk ∗ Postt) + γjt + αk + ǫjkt (A10)
where, importjkt is the value of imported textile product k from origin j in year t.
I include origin-year and product fixed effects. I allow the error term to cluster at the
product level. Products refer to HS 6 level codes.
Figure A2: This figure displays the import share of the top ten textile sources for
Bangladesh during the pre-2011 years.
The results of estimating equation (A1) are presented in Table A2. The first column
displays the results when estimated on the full sample. The second column displays
the results when estimated using only the top 10 origins, as shown in Figure A2, in the
main text. The third column shows the results using the full sample and interacting
the Wovenk ∗ Postt variable with an indicator that takes the value of one if origin
j is an LDC country. The revision of the double transformation policy did result in a
statistically significant decline in the value of imported textiles from LDC countries. The
double-transformation policy allowed for imports of textiles from other LDC countries.
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Bangladeshi textiles imports appear to substitute away from LDC countries after the
rules of origin revision.
Table A2: Imports of textiles
(1) (2) (3)
Only Top 10
Wovenk ∗ Postt -0.04 0.14 -0.02
(0.206) (0.232) (0.203)
Wovenk ∗ Postt ∗ I(LDC = 1) -2.05***
(0.768)
Observations 10,499 6,116 10,499
R-squared 0.575 0.602 0.575
Fixed Effects Commodity, Origin-Year Commodity, Origin-Year Commodity, Origin-Year
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table displays the results of estimating the regression model outlined in equation A1.
The lack of statistical significance in column 2 of table A2 may be due to heterogeneity
across origin country. To further investigate the effect of the rules of origin revision
on textile imports, I estimate equation (A1) separately for each of the top 10 trading
partners. Table A3 displays the results. I find that imports of textiles from China
increased after the policy change. China’s woven textile production industry is highly
developed, and can offer textiles at a low cost. Bangladeshi importers also reduced
imports of textiles from Vietnam, which was the 10th largest supplier of textiles prior
to the rules of origin revision. The change in imports from other sources is less precisely
estimated. The results are similar if log-quantity is used as a dependent variable.
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Table A3: Imports of textiles–Top 10 Partners
Origin β1 Number of Observations
China 0.52** 1063
(0.25)
Hong Kong 0.41 881
(0.36)
India -0.09 776
(0.31)
Pakistan 0.52 538
(0.76)
Thailand -0.45 612
(0.55)
South Korea -0.41 677
(0.63)
Indonesia 0.52 418
(0.51)
Malaysia -0.93 311
(0.65)
Japan 0.68 296
(0.47)
Vietnam -2.58*** 281
(0.79)
This table displays the results of estimating the regression
model laid out in equation A1. The regression is estimated
separately for each of the top 10 suppliers of Bangladeshi
textiles.
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Table A4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Enter Dest. Adders Prod. Adders Brand New Total Exit Prod Droppers Dest Droppers Complete Exit Incumbent Net Entry
Quantity Share
t 0.13*** 0.00 0.10*** 0.03 -0.10*** -0.06 0.00 -0.04* 0.03 -0.03
(0.033) (0.003) (0.033) (0.024) (0.035) (0.037) (0.002) (0.021) (0.032) (0.032)
Constant 0.30*** 0.00* 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.00*** 0.05*** 0.62*** 0.38***
(0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577
R-squared 0.663 0.005 0.466 0.241 0.603 0.525 0.004 0.114 0.014 0.014
Value Share
t 0.12*** 0.00 0.11*** 0.01 -0.09*** -0.06 0.00 -0.03* 0.03 -0.03
(0.032) (0.003) (0.033) (0.022) (0.034) (0.036) (0.002) (0.020) (0.032) (0.032)
Constant 0.29*** 0.00** 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.00*** 0.05*** 0.61*** 0.39***
(0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577
R-squared 0.644 0.005 0.455 0.231 0.582 0.511 0.005 0.107 0.013 0.013
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table displays the results of estimating the regression model laid out in equation (29).
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Table A5: Incumbent Share Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Quantity Share
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt 0.02 -0.04 -0.07* 0.09**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.039) (0.041)
Constant 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.40***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Observations 1,939 1,939 1,939 1,939
R-squared 0.036 0.013 0.003 0.033
Value Share
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Postt 0.01 -0.03 -0.07* 0.09**
(0.029) (0.032) (0.039) (0.039)
Constant 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.42***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Observations 1,939 1,939 1,939 1,939
R-squared 0.030 0.015 0.002 0.025
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table displays the results of estimating the regression model laid out in equation
(29) for each quartile of firm productivity, measured by number of products sold.
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Table A6: Event Study
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Product-level revenue Product-level revenue Prods per firm-deset Prods per firm-dest Firms per prod-dest Firms per prod-dest
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Y R2008 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.08* 0.02 -0.06
(0.055) (0.075) (0.036) (0.045) (0.052) (0.040)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Y R2009 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.00
(0.044) (0.067) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023) (0.022)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Y R2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Y R2011 0.12*** 0.04 0.05* 0.05* 0.02 0.04
(0.046) (0.048) (0.033) (0.025) (0.046) (0.031)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Y R2012 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.08** 0.07**
(0.059) (0.074) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.031)
EUj ∗Wovenk ∗ Y R2013 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.24*** 0.12*** 0.06*
(0.085) (0.066) (0.045) (0.054) (0.031) (0.034)
Constant 16.06*** 16.07*** 2.22*** 2.18*** 6.59*** 6.61***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 83,326 83,159 34,068 36,781 2,566 2,544
R-squared 0.606 0.617
Firm-prod FE x x
Firm-dest FE x x
Dest-prod FE x x
Woven-Post FE x x x
Dest-Year FE x x x x x x
Dest-Woven FE x x x x
Dest-Prod FE x x
Woven-Year FE x
Prod-Year FE x x
error cluster prod prod firm firm prod prod
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table displays the results of estimating the event-study framework outlined in section 5.4.
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